

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 1, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: M. P. Duncan and M. T. Sautman, SRS Site Representatives
SUBJECT: SRS Report for Week Ending February 1, 2008

Waste Solidification Building: The Board's staff reviewed the ability of the general service fire water supply system to support the safety-significant fire suppression system.

H Tank Farms: The Site Reps met with DOE and contractor management to discuss the response to leaks that may be detected while transferring the aluminum-rich supernate from tank 51 to 11 this weekend. The annulus inspection plan was revised to clarify that the transfer will be shut down if a leak site is discovered.

H-Canyon: The Site Rep observed a Super Kukla dry run where 6M shipping containers were opened in the hot crane maintenance area and product cans were removed and loaded into charging bundles. The Facility Self-Assessment for this activity was completed.

Defense Waste Processing Facility: During operations to determine the cause of pressure surges in a processing tank, two jumpers were removed causing another tank to be isolated from the process vessel ventilation system. As required to implement a Specific Administrative Control, the facility should have immediately started tracking the time the tank lost proper ventilation in order to restore it in time to prevent a flammable atmosphere in the tank's headspace. Two days after ventilation was lost, the facility discovered the problem, took action to prevent a Technical Safety Requirement violation, and held a critique. Corrective actions will be developed, including measures to strengthen the work package review process. The facility will also re-evaluate the need for this control as the estimated time to the lower flammability limit was longer than a year.

Transuranic (TRU) Waste: The Site Rep observed TRU remediation in both the F-Canyon truckwell and warm crane maintenance area. While workers used gloved hands to pull plastic bags of waste out of the drum, rip open plastic bags, and sort through waste at the former, tool use and management oversight was stronger in the latter location.

Criticality Safety: As part of their operational awareness process, DOE Environmental Management criticality subject matter experts conducted the first of four planned visits to SRS. An effectiveness review examined the corrective actions arising from the 2006 assessment.

Tank 48: EM-21 is providing funds to keep wet air oxidation a viable backup to fluidized bed steam reforming.

K Area: In response to a hazard control violation and self-assessment findings, facility management is trying to improve their transient combustible process and the rigor of its implementation.